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INTRODUCTION
Population ageing is one of the trends 
that have defi ned the development of ad-
vanced industrialized societies for already 
more than half a century. Not only is it in-
creasing the ratio of the dependent to active 
population in the labour force, thus putting 
pensions systems of advanced industrial-
ized countries under a great strain, but it 
is also causing an increase in the costs of 
health and elderly care services needed to 
accommodate growing demands of ageing 
population. At the same time, advanced in-
dustrialized societies face the demands to 
maintain suffi cient levels of spending on 
child care and education in order to sup-
port the demographic reproduction (Esp-
ing Anderson 2005b), do more to increase 
labour force participation among women 
and the younger population, and deal with 
the consequences of declining industrial 
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employment (see Iversen 2001). As popu-
lation ageing is likely to be followed with 
an increased demand for immigrant labour, 
these societies will also face pressure to al-
locate more resources to policies aimed at 
immigrant integration. 
All these developments lead to a sig-
nifi cant pressure on contemporary welfare 
states at a time when they are operating 
under circumstances Paul Pierson (2001) 
calls “the conditions of permanent auster-
ity”. Due to serious fi nancial constraints, it 
is to be expected that modern welfare states 
will not be able to answer all the additional 
demands placed upon them and at the same 
time keep current levels of social benefi ts 
(Castles 2004). Therefore, we could expect 
to see the emergence of a redistributive 
confl ict between social groups that differ in 
their consumption of social services and de-
pendency on income transfers. In the light 
of demographic trends, current spending 
patterns and reform measures, age is likely 
to feature prominently among the distribu-
tive divisions in mature welfare states.
On the one hand, the emergence of 
age-based distributive divisions is likely 
to be linked to the changes in distributive 
outcomes of pension systems, and, on the 
other, to the magnitude of welfare state 
spending bias toward the elderly. As pre-
vious research demonstrated, increase in 
pension spending over the last half a cen-
tury is not exclusively related to population 
ageing (see Castles 2004). According to 
Castles, the largest impact on the increase 
in overall pension spending is more due to 
steady increases in benefi t levels over the 
last several decades than to population age-
ing itself. This makes the current level of 
benefi ts the obvious target for reform. 
Since in most western societies ex-
tended families do not play an economic 
and social role they once did, the capacity 
of family ties to provide a glue of solidar-
ity between generations is likely to weaken 
signifi cantly. The fact that current systems 
of pension and social security were intro-
duced a generation or two ago and are now 
in a process of reform, means that the ex-
periences (or expectations) related to a par-
ticular form of social security system and 
its redistributive effects are likely to differ 
between generations. Current members of 
old and young age cohorts are likely to face 
different and less generous pension systems 
when they retire. Therefore, their prefer-
ences for intergenerational redistribution 
could end up being very different. We could 
also expect to see stronger demands of the 
younger segments of population for more 
social spending on services and transfers 
oriented toward younger population. 
This paper investigates whether we can 
observe the differences in spending prefer-
ences based on age, which could provide a 
foundation for confl icts over distribution 
of spending in advanced industrial socie-
ties. The analysis of preferences for spend-
ing on a number of specifi c social policies 
(education, health, pensions), conducted by 
Kitschelt and Rehm (2004), did not fi nd sys-
tematic differences in preferences between 
younger and older segments of the popu-
lation. However, our ability to observe the 
existence of distributive divisions is highly 
dependent on the measure of distributive 
preferences we use. Kitschelt and Rehm 
used a dependent variable that measures 
preferences for lower or higher spending 
for various social programs. Here I use a 
dependent variable that measures respond-
ent preferences when faced with a trade-off 
between pension and other types of social 
spending. As the development of particular 
national patterns of age-based distributive 
divisions is expected to be highly depend-
ent on the characteristics of national welfare 
systems, the importance of age as the source 
of distributive divisions is very likely to 
vary across national contexts.
To answer these questions, on individual 
level I use survey data from Eurobarometer 
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56.1 (2001). This survey is purposefully de-
signed for the collection of data about the 
attitudes toward pension systems, pension 
reforms and social inequality. The analysis 
includes nine countries (Germany, Italy, 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, 
Greece, Denmark and Spain). 
 I proceed by outlining some important 
aspects of national welfare and pension 
systems and their distributive effects. This 
part is followed by hypotheses outlining 
the impact of individual level variables in 
different national contexts. Finally, these 
propositions are tested with statistical anal-
ysis using Eurobarometer data.
NATIONAL WELFARE SYSTEMS 
AND DISTRIBUTIVE DIVISIONS
Welfare system spending bias and 
distributive divisions
The spending focus of welfare systems 
of advanced capitalist countries is highly 
dependent on the nature and the size of dif-
ferent welfare programs (Lynch 2001). It is 
a well-known fact that welfare programs 
of countries such as Germany, Austria or 
Italy, have spending programs heavily bi-
ased toward the elderly. This spending bias 
is mostly due to high spending on gener-
ous occupational public pension schemes 
and underdevelopment of services aimed 
at younger segments of the population. On 
the other hand, countries such as Sweden, 
the Netherlands, France and Denmark, are 
characterized by generous spending on 
service provision and transfers directed to-
wards younger segments of the population, 
producing a welfare system with only with 
marginal, if any, age bias (Esping Anderson 
1999, Lynch 2001, 2006). 
It can be expected that intergenerational 
distributive confl icts will be stronger in 
the countries that have visible spending 
bias toward the elderly. As the sustain-
ability of current spending levels is com-
ing under scrutiny, reform moves in these 
countries are directed - albeit in some of 
them still only marginally - at reducing the 
current level of entitlements and benefi ts 
(see Scruggs and Allen 2004, Huber and 
Stephens 2001 for an overview of general 
trends and Galasso 2006 and Schludi 2005 
for the effects of pension reforms). At the 
same time, these countries are faced with 
demands to divert more resources to child 
care, especially in pre-school segment, as 
well as to provide for other services that 
would free women from their current car-
ing duties and allow them to participate 
fully in the labour market (Castles 2003). 
This is likely to become a pressing concern 
quite soon, as recent research on variation in 
fertility patterns suggests that visibly lower 
fertility rates in those countries are mainly 
due to the lack of suitable child care and 
fl exible work arrangements for working 
parents (Castles 2003).
It is therefore logical to expect that in 
those countries we will see very different 
spending preferences of older and younger 
population. This does not necessarily mean 
that we will observe a development of full 
distributional cleavage based on age in the 
foreseeable future. This will in part depend 
on the direction of future reforms and the 
willingness of political actors to politicise 
differences in spending preferences based 
on age. However, it is likely that we will 
be able to observe signifi cantly different 
patterns of attitudes toward social spend-
ing between older and younger segments 
of the population. 
The logic just described can be some-
what different in countries where familial 
links are strong and important in social and 
economic sense. In countries such as Italy, 
Greece or Spain, large number younger 
people are dependent on their families for 
housing provision and income, as high lev-
els of social protection awarded to older 
workers and retirees are also used for sup-
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porting younger unemployed workers and 
those employed in precarious jobs (see Esp-
ing Anderson 1999). Yet on the other hand, 
social policies of those countries are least 
favourable for the younger segments of the 
population. In Italy, to take just one exam-
ple, unemployment benefi ts are designed to 
protect insider industrial workers with sta-
ble employment (Esping Anderson 1999). 
Social services supporting participation of 
younger workers in the labour market are 
undeveloped, and the structure of labour, 
housing and credit markets make young 
people highly dependent on resources pro-
vided by their parents or relatives (Castles 
2004). In Spain, Greece and Italy, pension 
systems are still heavily biased toward male 
industrial workers and early retirement was 
highly prevalent in 1980s and 1990s. In 
such a context, the impact of intergenera-
tional distributive divisions is likely to be 
muted by the dependence of younger seg-
ments of the population on benefi ts award-
ed to their older parents and relatives. The 
magnitude of this dependence is refl ected 
in signifi cantly higher rates of co-residence 
of adult children with their parents in coun-
tries of Southern Europe2 (Hank 2005). 
As the fi gure 1 shows, the magnitude of 
welfare system spending bias toward the 
elderly is very strongly correlated with the 
rate of co-residence of adult children with 
their parents. 
Spending bias of the welfare system 
shown in fi gure 1 is measured with elderly 
non-elderly spending ratio. This ratio meas-
ures relative share of spending on programs 
for the elderly over spending of programs 
for the non-elderly. The measure includes 
all types of direct social transfers (pen-
sions, unemployment and sickness benefi ts, 
child and family allowances, social assist-
ance) and spending on health and education 
(Lynch 2001).
Figure 1. 
Relationship between welfare system spending focus and the importance of family as provider of social 
security
2 Percentage of adult children co-residing with their parents ranges from 63% in Italy, 57% in Greece, 56% in 
Spain at the higher end of the range to 38% in Austria, 35% in Germany, 27% in France and 25% in the Nether-
lands in the middle to 18% in Sweden and 17% in Denmark at lower end of the range (Source: Hank 2005). 
3 Alternatively, we could also argue that younger segments of the population, instead of being focused on 
maintaining their parents’ social benefi ts would strongly prefer increased spending on programs focused on their 
age group, even if faced with distributive trade-off. But given that in the existing system actors are well informed 
about the distributive effects and have a system of expectations and obligation in place which is not limited to 
solely to pure transfer of money and property, I fi nd the logic stated in the text to be more likely. 
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Given the fact that the elderly spending 
focus and the importance of family in the 
welfare system are so strongly correlated, 
we could expect that the effect of welfare 
system spending bias on spending prefer-
ences would be somewhat reduced3.
Since we can reasonably expect these 
two variables to pull in different direc-
tions, they might in the end cancel each 
other out reducing the effect of age close 
to zero. However, identifying whether this 
is the case is not a particular problem, since 
in countries with elderly spending bias 
and weaker familial links the effect of age 
should be in accordance with the expecta-
tions stated. 
In countries where welfare system is 
characterized by small or weak spending 
bias, the distributive divisions based on age 
effect of age based differences in spending 
preferences is expected to be small. 
To illustrate the distributive differences 
between systems with different spending 
focus, we can take a look at the data describ-
ing the link between welfare regime spend-
ing focus and distributive consequences, in 
this case poverty, for different population 
segments. The argument advanced here is 
that these distributive results, through their 
social consequences, affect preferences of 
different age groups concerning the allo-
cation of public spending. As correlation 
coeffi cients in table 1 show, poverty rates 
among younger segments of the popula-
tion are signifi cantly lower in welfare sys-
tems with balanced spending focus than 
in systems that are visibly biased toward 
the elderly. 
Table 1. 
Correlation coeffi cients between Elderly Spending Focus and measures of poverty among different social 
groups 
Poverty Rate -Working 
Age Population



























Coeffi cients are computed for 11 countries using data from two time points indicating average values of 
variables for 1980s and 1990s. N=24, after removal of outliers (two time points for US) N= 22. Values in 
parentheses denote statistical signifi cance of correlation coeffi cients. Source of poverty data Huber and 
Stephens (2004), source of elderly spending focus Lynch (2001).
are likely to be less prominent compared 
to the divisions based on the exposure to 
labour market risk, socio-economic status 
or sector of employment. This does not im-
ply that these countries will not experience 
politically potent competition for resources 
between social spending programs. How-
ever, in countries where spending trade-off 
is less likely and where elderly are not vis-
ibly better-off than younger segments of the 
population in terms of public spending, the 
We can see that poverty is generally 
higher in countries with spending bias to-
ward the elderly. This can be accounted 
for by the fact that liberal welfare systems, 
which generally have higher poverty rates, 
have systems featuring universal pension’s 
schemes and very limited programs ori-
ented toward the younger segments of the 
population. This makes their spending ratio 
highly biased toward the elderly. However, 
correlation coeffi cients between measures 
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of elderly spending bias and poverty rates 
among children, single mothers and work-
ing age population are twice the size of cor-
relation coeffi cients between the measures 
of elderly spending bias and poverty rate 
among the elderly. Removing the US as an 
outlier from the calculation of correlation 
coeffi cients reduces the size of all coeffi -
cients visibly, and the correlation between 
old age poverty and elderly spending bias 
becomes insignifi cantly small. However, 
the fi nding that the elderly spending bias 
is strongly correlated with poverty among 
children, single mothers and working-age 
population remains. 
The differences in poverty rates are just 
a manifestation of the effects of a number of 
policy measures that affect distributive out-
comes. Looking at spending on child care, 
family spending, enrolment in child care 
for children under three, maternity spend-
ing per birth and long term unemployment 
rates for youth, to take just a number of in-
dicators affecting the measures of elderly 
spending bias (see table 2), it is visible that 
younger segments of the population are 
visibly better off in terms of social policy 
measures in countries that do not exhibit 
elderly spending bias (Sweden, Denmark, 
Netherlands, France), than in those that do 
(Greece, Spain, Italy, Austria, Germany). 
It is the strength of these differences 
among countries that I expect to condition 
the strength of distributive divisions based 
on age as, at the end of the day, these dif-
ferences have effects on the distributive 
outcomes and lives of citizens. 
Pension system and distributive 
divisions
The impact of pension systems on dis-
tributive divisions based on age depends 
on the level of discontinuity in distributive 
outcomes between generations produced 
by pension reforms. The effect is condi-
tional on two factors. The fi rst is the actual 
size of difference in distributive effects 
between younger and older generations as 
a consequence of pension reform. The sec-
ond factor is the ability of interest groups 
to mobilize collective action and make the 
actual or perceived effects of reform more 
visible to affected social groups. 
To facilitate the sustainability of pen-
sions systems, most reform packages pro-
posed in advanced industrialized societies 
comprise some combination of benefi t cuts, 
increases in retirement age, increases in 
duration of contribution needed to qualify 
for full pensions, changes in benefi t calcu-
lation formula, extension of period used to 
Table 2. 
















% of all Employed
Denmark 2.25 61.7 4 55 23.4
Sweden 1.5 39.5 3.5 65 15.8
Netherlands 0.5 39 1.6 22 40.2
France 1.5 26 3 31 41.2
Austria 0.5 4.1 3.1 35 25.3
Germany 1.1 9 2 27 53
Italy 0.6 6.3 1.2 25 49.9
Spain 0.6 20.7 1 17 24.5
Greece 0.4 7 1.3 11 52.2
Source: OECD Family data base (2004)
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calculate reference salary and elimination 
of special provisions for some occupational 
groups or occupational pension programs 
(see Schludi 2005 and Galasso 2006 for de-
tails). Most pension reform packages actu-
ally enacted have implemented to a differ-
ent degree a certain mix of these measures 
(Schludi 2005, Myles 2002, Rhodes and 
Natali 2003, Galasso 2006). 
The implementation of these reforms 
creates a situation where future generation 
of retirees are likely to retire under a dif-
ferent system than the current generation 
of retirees, usually at lower benefi t levels 
and at an older age, while at the same time 
paying transition costs for relatively com-
fortable benefi t levels of current retirees. 
How large will these effects be depends 
on the changes in the elements of the pen-
sion system, such as minimum retirement 
age, benefi t calculation formula, required 
contribution period and reference earnings 
for benefi t calculation. Another important 
factor is a fragmentation of pension system 
in the occupational schemes, whether sepa-
rate schemes for public employees exist 
and whether these schemes have separate 
rules regarding required contribution peri-
ods, retirement age and benefi t calculation 
formula and so on. 
While calculating differences in the dis-
tributive outcomes before and after pension 
reform would go way beyond the scope of 
this article, some elements of reforms im-
portant for distributive outcomes can be 
highlighted and this can allow us to assess 
the amount of discontinuity in the system. 
The largest distributive effects can be 
expected in countries of continental Europe 
with occupational pension systems. Italy, 
France, Germany, Spain and Austria had 
pension systems that were characterized by 
generous protection of labour market insid-
ers (Schludi 2005). Benefi t calculation for-
mula guaranteed high replacement rates, a 
reference salary was calculated on the basis 
of best earning years, required contribution 
period allowed workers to retire in their 50s 
and provisions for early retirement allowed 
this to take place without a signifi cant loss 
of income. In addition, these countries had 
a special pillar for public sector employees 
that usually guaranteed even more favour-
able conditions in terms of retirement age, 
replacement rate and contribution require-
ments for those employed in the public 
sector. Since the system was designed for 
workers with stable work histories and in-
creasing earnings, it could not cope well 
with the rising number of workers with less 
stable work histories who relied on part-
time or temporary work and those with long 
unemployment spells.
Reforms in these systems were bound to 
change the distributive outcomes between 
generations substantially. In all countries, 
except perhaps Spain and Greece (see Ga-
lasso 2006), reform measures aimed at, and 
for largest part succeeded in increasing the 
retirement age, the lengthening of contribu-
tion period, extending the period for calcu-
lation of reference salary and changing the 
formula that would link pension benefi ts 
closer to work histories, thereby penalizing 
early retirement, and reducing replacement 
rate (Schludi 2005, Galasso 2006). The re-
forms, with varying success, also aimed at 
eliminating the special position of public 
sector workers and bringing their pensions 
in line with those for the rest of the popu-
lation. Galasso (2006) and Schludi (2005) 
give an extensive overview of reforms in 
Italy, Germany, France and Austria, and 
both conclude that implemented reforms 
will not signifi cantly affect current retirees 
and workers due to retire shortly. However, 
the effects of reforms will affect younger 
generations, as they will have to work long-
er, pay for the transition costs and will cer-
tainly have lower pension benefi ts relative 
to their salary than current retirees. 
Similar measures aimed at increasing 
contribution period, linking benefi ts closer 
196
Rev. soc. polit., god. 15, br. 2, str. 189-207, Zagreb 2008. Henjak A.: Population Ageing and Distributive Confl icts...
to work history, raising retirement age and 
reducing replacement rate were imple-
mented in Denmark, Sweden and the Neth-
erlands as well (Schludi 2005, van Riel, 
Hemerijck and Visser 2002). However, the 
Netherlands, given its highly solvent and 
largely funded pension system based on a 
large number of occupational schemes, did 
not need to implement reform that would 
substantially alter distributive outcomes. 
Sweden and Denmark had signifi cantly 
higher effective retirement age and much 
higher level of labour market participation, 
both of which somewhat reduced the effect 
of changes in system parameters (Galasso 
and Profeta 2004). Moreover, these coun-
tries do not have signifi cant population of 
outsiders that exists in occupation based 
pension systems, and reforms included the 
implementation of measures to equalize 
position of those with unstable work histo-
ries with labour market insiders. Therefore, 
as reforms are less likely to bring sizable 
changes in conditions under which younger 
and older generation retire, the level of dis-
continuity in universalist systems is likely 
to be lower. 
Public opinion research on pension 
reform in advanced industrial countries 
shows that there is a large degree of aware-
ness about the current situation of pension 
systems (Boeri and Tabellini 2005, Boeri, 
Borsch-Suppan and Tabellini 2002). The 
bulk of the public perceives that problem 
exists, links it with population ageing and 
is aware of the need for reform. However, 
the actual knowledge about pension sys-
tems and reform programs is very low 
(Boeri and Tabellini 2005). This is some-
what problematic if one wants to argue that 
the expectations about redistributive effects 
of pension reform between generations are 
likely to cause differences in support for 
social spending. However, there exist a 
number of factors that are likely to increase 
the awareness of general public about the 
state of pension systems. 
Some of the measures implemented 
in pension reforms are very visible and 
have easily understandable distributive 
consequences, such as the increase in the 
retirement age, the extension of the con-
tribution period needed to qualify for full 
pension and the extension of period for 
calculating reference salary (Galasso and 
Profeta 2004, Schludi 2005). More im-
portantly, occupational pension systems 
have clearly defi ned their clientele and 
are governed by corporatist bodies where 
interest groups, most notably trade unions, 
with a stake in the system are represented 
(Schludi 2005). 
This particular arrangement is likely to 
make it easier to mobilize the opposition 
and increase the visibility of the distributive 
effects of pension reform. Therefore, the 
public does not need to be informed about 
all the details of pension reform to be aware 
that it is likely to have substantial distribu-
tive effects. Interest groups representing 
various client groups of pension system will 
act as opinion leaders on the issue provid-
ing information and articulating positions 
about changes happening as a consequence 
of reforms (Galasso 2006). 
The universalist nature of the system 
in Sweden and Denmark, or extreme frag-
mentation in the Dutch case, prevents the 
creation of powerful special interest groups 
formed by the clients of particular occupa-
tional programs. Lower potentials of col-
lective actors to mobilize public opinion 
are likely to make distributive effects of the 
reform less visible to the public. 
The political struggles and public pro-
tests over pension reform in Italy, Germany, 
France, Greece and Austria (see Schludi 
2005 for details for each country) and the 
absence of large-scale problems in Swe-
den, Denmark or Netherlands suggest that 
interest group mobilization mechanism in 
particularistic systems might indeed be at 
work. 
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HYPOTHESES
The effects of age are expected to vary 
according to contextual differences across 
countries, namely spending bias of the 
welfare system, the type of the pension 
system and the importance of family in the 
provisions of social services and income 
security to younger members of the popu-
lation. While overall we can expect spend-
ing preferences to vary across age groups, 
this effect is likely to be stronger in those 
countries exhibiting stronger spending bias 
toward the elderly, in the countries with an 
important role of the family in the provision 
of services and income security to younger 
population and in the countries with frag-
mented occupational pension systems. This 
leads us to the following hypothesis. 
H1: Older individuals are likely to sup-
port increasing spending on elderly related 
programs, even if this includes redistribu-
tion of resources from other social pro-
grams. The opposite effect can be expected 
from younger individuals.
The strength of the age effect described 
is likely to depend on contextual factors 
which defi ne national welfare system.
H2: The effect of age is expected to be 
stronger in countries with welfare systems 
exhibiting spending bias toward the elderly. 
H3: The effect of age is likely to be 
stronger in countries where pension re-
forms produced a high level of discontinu-
ity in the institutional arrangements and 
distributive outcomes, and where interest 
groups were able to increase the visibility 
of pension reform. 
H4: In countries where family provides 
large share of social services and income 
security for younger population, the effect 
of age is likely to be dampened.
While the paper primarily focuses on 
age and the differences in the effect of age 
across countries, we can identify a number 
of additional variables likely to infl uence 
spending preferences. These variables are 
included in the analysis as controls and their 
expected effects are briefl y outlined as well. 
Members of social groups dependent on 
public spending, such as parents with young 
children dependent on public child care and 
education, or the unemployed and those ex-
posed to high labour market risk dependent 
on unemployment benefi ts and active la-
bour market programs, are expected to ex-
hibit opposition to increasing spending on 
programs focused on the elderly at the ex-
pense of other programs. Spending prefer-
ences of public sector employees are likely 
to depend on the nature of welfare system. 
In systems with highly developed public 
services, public sector employees are likely 
to oppose the increases in spending for the 
elderly if these are likely to reduce spending 
on other services. On the other hand, in sys-
tems with low level of public sector serv-
ice provision and smaller public sector, we 
can expect that public sector workers will 
support stronger elderly spending, mainly 
in order to safeguard their pension benefi ts 
(Rothenbacher 2005). Therefore we can ex-
pect that the effect of employment in public 
sector is likely to vary in accordance with 
the spending focus of welfare state, which 
is itself highly correlated with the size of 
public sector services (Lynch 2006). The in-
dividuals who own signifi cant private pen-
sion assets, and are less dependent on public 
pension programs, are likely to oppose the 
increased spending for the elderly, as op-
posed to those without additional private 
pension assets. Women are expected to be 
more opposed to increases in spending for 
programs oriented toward the elderly at the 
cost of other social spending than men, as 
they are in greater need of publicly funded 
social services, such as child care and care 
for frail elderly persons, and are more likely 
to work in the public sector. The effect of 
socio-economic status and education on 
preferences for increasing spending for the 
elderly is likely to be negative, as respond-
ents featuring high income and education 
are less likely to support any type of in-
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creased social spending, and especially the 
one not focused on human capital formation 
(see Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). 
Lastly, I consider the impact of percep-
tion that population ageing might pose a 
problem for the future of pension systems 
and value position that pension provision 
should be an individual responsibility. I ex-
pect those respondents who perceive popu-
lation ageing to be a problem to be more 
inclined to oppose the increased spending 
on the elderly at the expense of other social 
programs. I also expect those respondents 
who believe that securing adequate pen-
sion income is a responsibility of an each 
individual to be opposed to an increased 
pension spending. 
DATA, VARIABLES AND 
METHOD
Data 
The data for the analysis are taken from 
the Eurobarometer survey number 56.1. 
This survey is designed with the purpose 
to collect the data on attitudes toward pen-
sion systems crisis and reform. The data 
used here include samples of population 
from nine countries that are characterized 
by suffi cient variation with respect to all 
relevant contextual variables. These coun-
tries are Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Greece, Denmark, Spain 
and Austria. Selected countries not only 
differ in the type of their pension systems, 
but also in the spending focus and institu-
tional characteristics of their welfare sys-
tems. Within the sample, we have countries 
with spending focus that is heavily oriented 
towards the elderly, such as Spain, Greece 
and Italy, and those with spending focus 
more oriented toward the young, such as 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands (see 
Lynch 2001). Concerning pension systems, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria, Greece 
and France all have occupational systems 
where social partners play important role 
in administration, Sweden, Denmark and 
the Netherlands have system where fund-
ed public and private pillars are added to 
universalist fi rst pillar (Rhodes and Natali 
2003). All countries have implemented 
pension reform of some type, but the dis-
tributive consequences are considered to 
be largest is France, Italy and Germany 
(Rothenbacher 2004, Galasso and Profeta 
2003, Schludi 2005, Galasso 2006). 
Within the sample, there are countries 
whose welfare systems assign very different 
roles to families in the provision of social 
services. In Denmark and Sweden this role 
is very small, while in Italy, Greece and 
Spain it is quite large (Esping Anderson 
1999). The overview of the position of each 
country on individual contextual variables 
is provided in table 3. 
Table 3. 
Approximate distribution of contextual characteristics among nine countries
Elderly-Non elderly 
spending ratio
Discontinuity of distributive 
outcomes of pension system/interest 
group mobilization potential
Importance of family 
for provision of social 
services
Austria medium medium/high high
Germany medium high/high medium
Sweden low medium/low low
Netherlands medium low/low medium
Spain high medium/high high
Italy high high/high high
France medium high/high low
Denmark low medium/low low
Greece high low/high high
Sources: (Lynch 2001), Galasso (2006), Schludi (2005), SSA overview of national social security systems 
and Hank (2005). Entries are author’s own estimates based on data from named sources.
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The size of every sample is around 1000 
respondents. The respondents from East-
ern Germany are excluded from the Ger-
man sample to avoid potential problems of 
comparability in attitudes between samples 
from the Eastern and Western parts of the 
country, as the respondents from the Eastern 
part of Germany were part of the welfare 
and pension systems for only a decade at the 
time this survey was conducted. To elimi-
nate the problem of missing values, I used 
Amelia software for a multiple imputation 
of missing data. 
METHOD 
Since I expect the effects of individual 
level variables, both as slopes and inter-
cepts, to vary across national contexts, the 
analysis is conducted on individual country 
samples to control the effects of contextual 
variables. This will allow us to isolate the 
effect of contextual characteristics and get 
a clear picture about the effects of our key 
independent variables across countries. The 
downside is that this method does not al-
low us to assess the full information about 
the importance of contextual variables that 
some other method including contextual 
variables, such as multilevel cross-coun-
try pooled analysis, would. However, I 
maintain that the amount of information 
that can be gained about the performance 
of independent variables of interest, age in 
this case, is actually higher with the use of 
country by country analysis than through 
the use of some type of two level regres-
sions with pooled data. Using country by 
country, OLS regression analysis allows us 
to see how the effect of age behaves across 
countries and allows us to spot effects, if 
those exist even in one country, that are not 
in accordance with the expected effects of 
contextual variables. At the same time, with 
the use of statistical simulation techniques, 
we can still see whether the effect of age, 
both intercept and slope, varies across coun-
tries and how.
Since the dependent variable is meas-
ured as an ordinal scale, ordinal logit or pro-
bit are seemingly more appropriate regres-
sion methods than OLS. However, I choose 
OLS for the following reasons. Substantive 
results do not change whether OLS or the 
ordered logit and probit are used. Patterns 
of coeffi cients and their statistical power 
are very similar. Since I simulate results by 
transferring parameters values into actual 
values using Clarify module of STATA, the 
simulation based on OLS gives the actual 
value of the variable as opposed to logit and 
probit that allow the simulation of changes 
in standard values. The use of simulation 
based on OLS makes the interpretation of 
fi ndings more intuitive and easier. Finally, 
the imputation of missing data with the use 
of Amelia software transfers the ordinal 
variable into continuous by imputing val-
ues that are in between the original values 
of the variable. 
Apart from age, the model includes 
measures of socio-economic position, 
namely income, education, public sector 
employment, sex and union membership; 
measures of dependence on social security 
system, namely ownership of private pen-
sion assets, unemployment risk and depend-
ence on child care services and measures of 
perception of consequences of population 
aging and attitudes toward the importance 
of individual provision for old age. The 
model can be expressed with the follow-
ing equation. 
Y x xsocial service
dependence
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VARIABLES  
The dependent variable measures 
whether a respondent would be willing to 
increase pension spending even if it would 
imply cuts in spending for other public pro-
grams. Such wording implies a distributive 
trade-off between spending on pensions 
and other public spending, however, its 
downside is that question wording does 
not specify whether spending cuts should 
cover just social spending or spending on a 
wider range of government programs. The 
dependent variable is measured as a scale 
ranging from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating strong 
agreement with increases in pension spend-
ing over spending on other programs, and 4 
indicating strong opposition to it.
Independent variables are operational-
ized in the following way:
• Age is measured as a continuous vari-
able indicating respondent’s age.
• Employment in the public sector is 
measured as a dummy variable in which 
1 stands for those employed in the pub-
lic sector and 0 for others. 
• Union membership is measured as a 
dummy variable in which 1 is for union 
members and 0 for others. 
• Ownership and private pension assets 
are measured by counting whether the 
respondent owns any of the alternative 
sources of retirement income, including 
private pension accounts, fi nancial as-
sets such as shares and bonds or income 
from property. 
• Risk of unemployment is measured by 
the number of times the respondent was 
unemployed in last fi ve years.
• Dependence on social services is meas-
ured with a variable indicating the pres-
ence of young children in the respond-
ent’s household. 
• Sex is measured as a dummy variable 
where 1 indicates women and 0 men.
• Education is measured through a vari-
able recoded from the variable asking 
respondents when they fi nished their 
regular education and indicating three 
levels of education, roughly correspond-
ing to elementary, high school and uni-
versity education. 
• Income is measured as the position of 
a respondent in income quartiles in na-
tional income distribution. 
• Perception of crisis of pensions system 
is measured with a variable indicating 
whether a respondent perceives that 
population ageing is posing a major 
problem, a minor problem or no prob-
lem at all. 
• Position toward individual responsibil-
ity for pension provision is measured 
with an additive index formed of two 
items. The fi rst item asks the respond-
ent whether he or she thinks that the 
respondent pension should be based 
strictly on the amount of contribution 
one has paid in the system, and the 
second asking whether the respondent 
thinks an individual should be obliged 
to make their own pension provision for 
old age. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Though results of the regression analy-
sis in table 4 confi rm that some age dif-
ferences in spending preferences exist in 
most countries, the pattern of cross-coun-
try differences is actually running contrary 
to the expectations stated above. Age has 
statistically signifi cant effects in six out 
of nine countries included in the analysis, 
the exceptions being Germany, Italy and 
Greece. In all countries where it reaches 
statistical signifi cance, the effect of age is in 
the expected direction, with older respond-
ents showing higher levels of support for 
pension spending even at the cost of cuts 
in other types of spending than younger 
respondents. 
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However, cross-country variation does 
not conform to the expected pattern, as the 
effect of age is strongest in countries where 
it is expected to be the weakest. The results 
of regression analysis show that age has 
the strongest effects in Sweden and Den-
mark. In the Netherlands, Austria, Spain 
and France the impact of age is signifi cant, 
but substantially weaker. It must be noted 
though that even in Sweden and Denmark 
the substantive effect of age is not particu-
larly strong.
To provide a better picture of the sub-
stantive impact of age, I use a statistical 
sis into substantive and easily interpretable 
values. In this particular case, using param-
eter estimates from OLS regression Clarify 
computes changes in the actual values of 
dependent variables as values of one or 
more independent variables change. 
Figure 2 represents the results of simula-
tions calculated using Clarify, where values 
of age are changed in ten-year increments, 
and all other variables are set to their mean 
value. Figure 2 shows that slopes and inter-
cepts for age vary widely across countries. 
They also show that some substantive ef-
fects exist only in Sweden and Denmark. 
simulation to show how change in the value 
of age affects support for increased spend-
ing on pensions over spending on other 
programs. For this purpose, I use Clarify 
software developed by Gary King as a mod-
ule of STATA statistical package. In short, 
Clarify turns the results of statistical analy-
But even in those two countries moving 
from the youngest to the oldest age category 
would only move a respondent from a posi-
tion somewhere between mild disagreement 
and mild agreement to a position between 
mild and strong agreement to the proposi-
tion that pension spending should be in-
Figure 2. 
Changes in respondent willingness to increase pension spending at the expense of other spending programs 
as age increases
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creased, even if it implies cuts in spending 
on other programs. In absolute values, this 
would indicate a move of around 0.6 on a 
scale of 1 to 4. It is hardly an overwhelming 
change considering that we would have to 
move over the whole age range to reach this 
value. In other countries with signifi cant re-
gression coeffi cients for age, the magnitude 
of change as we move from the lowest to 
the highest value is not nearly as strong. In 
fact, for the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and 
France the change we observe in fi gure 2 
is less than 0.2 on dependent variable that 
ranges from 1 to 4 as we move from the 
youngest to the oldest respondent.
In countries where strongest age effects 
are expected, the simulation shows that as 
the age of respondent increases, his or her 
preferences for spending on pensions over 
other spending programs does not change 
at all. The line for Germany, Greece and 
Italy in fi gure 2 is essentially fl at and the 
average respondent is somewhere between 
mildly to strongly supportive of increasing 
spending on pensions, even if that implies 
cuts in spending on other programs.
 This lack of the effect of age on the pref-
erences for spending on pension, even at the 
price of cuts in other spending, in Italy and 
Greece could be explained by the high cor-
relation between spending bias and the de-
pendence of adult children on their parents 
for housing and income security. As these 
two contextual variables are expected to 
have the opposite effects on spending pref-
erences, the lack of visible age effect could 
be due to these two contextual variables 
cancelling each other out. Cancelling effect 
could be due, as Esping Anderson (1999) 
notes, to sizable intergenerational income 
transfers taking place within family and 
benefi ting younger family members which 
compensate for inadequacies of social secu-
rity systems and social services provision, 
ineffi ciencies of housing market and low 
employment levels among youth. 
Another reason for this lack of age ef-
fect could be because the public perceives 
public pension system as the most effi cient 
and comprehensive social security program 
and the only mechanism that can effectively 
provide security in old age. It could be that 
because of these reasons even younger seg-
ments of the population of these countries 
are willing to provide additional support for 
the system, even at the cost of cuts in other 
spending programs. This argument is not 
directly opposed to the argument advanced 
above that discontinuity in pension system 
is likely to cause differences in preferences 
between age groups. But rather, it could 
be argued that our fi ndings refl ect an op-
position to the creation of discontinuity by 
keeping the system as it is. Also, as public 
pension system is in a way a fl agship pro-
gram of welfare state in continental coun-
tries (Lynch 2006), the support for increas-
ing pension spending on pensions might, in 
fact, refl ect general public support for social 
security programs. 
The reason why we observe the strong-
est differences in spending preferences be-
tween younger and older segments of the 
population in Sweden and Denmark could 
actually be the artefact of the dependent 
variable used here. Since the wording of 
an item used as a dependent variable men-
tions increasing spending on pension, even 
under price of cuts elsewhere, it is reason-
able to expect that younger segments of the 
population in the countries with extensive 
spending on programs directed toward the 
young would be less than enthusiastic to 
support increases in pensions spending at 
the price of cuts in services and transfers 
they are immediately benefi ting from.
Other important fi nding worth noting 
is the effect of education, signifi cant in six 
countries out of nine. Regression coeffi -
cients show that respondents with higher 
education are inclined to oppose increases 
in spending on pensions if that implies 
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spending cuts elsewhere. This opposition 
does not seem to be related to the general 
opposition to spending by the highly edu-
cated. The lack of effect of measures of so-
cio-economic position, such as income and 
ownership of private pension assets, seems 
to support this conclusion. Income does not 
register signifi cant effects in any country, 
while private pension assets have signifi -
cant effects only in minority of countries 
analysed, though in all of them their effects 
are in the expected direction. It seems more 
likely that the effect of education is due to 
the opposition of the highly educated to an 
increased spending on programs which are 
not in themselves productive investment at 
the price of cuts in spending on programs 
that could be important for human capital 
formation and economic competitiveness 
such as education and research. 
With respect to other control variables, 
regression results do not reveal the ex-
istence of any cross-country pattern that 
would be related to contextual differences 
I focus on here. While signifi cant effects 
are registered for public sector employ-
ment, unemployment risk, the attitudes 
toward individual responsibility for pen-
sion provision and the belief that popula-
tion ageing represents a serious social and 
economic problem, a clear cross-country 
pattern is missing and in cases of variables 
measuring unemployment risk and public 
sector employment, the direction of these 
effects is not in accordance with expecta-
tions. As these fi ndings cannot be linked to 
any meaningful cross-country differences, I 
will not discuss them in detail here. 
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to assess the 
importance of the differences in spending 
preferences based on age and to investigate 
whether the strength of age divisions varies 
across countries that signifi cantly differ in 
the design and distributive effects of their 
welfare systems. The obvious criticism to 
the proposition that age could be the source 
of distributive divisions is that being young 
or old is not a stable social trait, but some-
thing that invariably changes as one gets 
older. Furthermore, embeddedness in fam-
ily and social network lengthens the hori-
zon an individual takes into account when 
forming spending preferences, so that it 
includes considerations and potential needs 
of his parents and children. Broadening of 
horizons and accounting for considerations 
of a larger number of people when form-
ing preferences over spending policies is 
likely to prevent individuals from making 
selfi sh decisions based on short term cal-
culations. However, the key to the validity 
of this argument is the existence of expec-
tations about the stability of distributive 
outcomes. If such stability is missing and 
distributive outcomes are diffi cult to pre-
dict, than it would be substantially more dif-
fi cult to reach a decision about what is best 
for oneself and others over the long term. If 
declining signifi cance of social links puts 
lives of children, parents and grandparents 
in different social setting, their ability to 
make decisions that will take into account 
considerations of other generations will 
surely decline. With changes taking place 
in pension and welfare systems, and family 
losing most of its traditional economic and 
social functions, the conditions for age to 
become a distributive division seem to be 
more favourable than at any previous point 
in history of modern societies. 
However, the analysis in this paper 
shows that the potential for age to become 
a distributive division is rather weak. The 
key element of the theory advanced here 
holds that the effect of age varies across so-
cial and economic contexts. This variation 
seems to depend largely on the differences 
in distributive outcomes across countries, 
which are in turn shaped by the character-
istics of welfare and pension systems. The 
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analysis did fi nd cross-country differences 
in the importance of age, but these are tak-
ing the form that is different from the one 
originally expected. 
The strongest divisions based on age 
are registered in the countries that exhibit 
smallest spending bias toward the elderly 
and where pension system reforms did not 
create sizable discontinuity between pre and 
post reform distributive outcomes. It seems 
that the age-based distributive divisions 
are important only in the countries where 
further spending on pensions can jeopard-
ize sizable spending on publicly provided 
social services and transfers focused on 
younger segments of the population. Where 
age spending bias already exists, the general 
support for increased pension spending is 
higher and there are no divisions between 
age groups worth pointing out. Perhaps this 
refl ects attitudes among the general public 
in continental and Mediterranean countries 
that public pension systems, as arguably the 
most generous and effi cient social security 
program, should be maintained even if 
some sacrifi ces are made in other programs 
that do not have a comparable level of uni-
versalism or generosity. 
It remains to be seen whether this in-
signifi cance of age will persist if discon-
tinuity in distributive outcomes of social 
security systems increases. Reforms of so-
cial security systems, most notably pension 
systems, are still in their initial phases and 
their distributive effects are not so easy to 
assess for general public. It might well be 
that, at some future point, the discontinuity 
and inequality in distributive outcomes be-
tween generations will become more visible 
and the importance of age-based divisions 
will increase. 
Overall, it seems that political potential 
of age-based divisions is rather small. It 
seems the strongest potential exists in the 
countries that are least fi nancially pressed 
to make hard choices in distributing in-
come between generations. In countries 
where we could expect this potential to 
be larger, the divisive potential of age is 
muted by what can be described as general 
willingness to preserve what is perceived 
as a generous and effi cient mechanism of 
providing social security in old age and by 
seemingly still strong links of intergenera-
tional solidarity. 
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Sažetak
STARENJE STANOVNIŠTVA I DISTRIBUTIVNI SUKOBI:




Razvijena industrijska društva suočena su s pritiscima veće potrošnje na mirovine i na 
usluge za starije osobe u isto vrijeme kada postoji potreba za većim ulaganjem u rastući 
udio mlađeg stanovništva u radnoj snazi i u integraciju imigranata potrebnih da se obnovi 
radna snaga koja stari. To priprema teren za distributivne sukobe između grupa koje su 
naklonjene različitim tipovima socijalne potrošnje. Članak tvrdi da snaga i priroda distribu-
tivnih sukoba uvelike ovisi o usmjerenju potrošnje unutar socijalnog sustava, vrsti mirovin-
skog sustava i važnosti obitelji unutar socijalnog sustava. Dok u zemljama s mirovinskim 
sustavima utemeljenim na profesijama i socijalnim sustavima s većom potrošnjom na starije 
osobe možemo očekivati snažnu prisutnost razlika na temelju dobi, u zemljama s univerzal-
nim mirovinskim sustavima i sa socijalnim sustavima s uravnoteženijim uzorcima potrošnje 
možemo očekivati mnogo manje učinke. Članak provjerava te tvrdnje rabeći Eurobarometer 
podatke. Rezultati potvrđuju tvrdnju u pogledu razlika na temelju dobi i njihovih varijacija 
u nacionalnim kontekstima. Čini se da su varijacije povezane s preusmjeravanjem troškova 
u socijalnoj državi, no na način koji nije u skladu s našim očekivanjima. 
Ključne riječi: mirovinski sustav, mirovinska reforma, distributivne podjele, starenje 
stanovništva, stavovi prema mirovinskim sustavima, fokus socijalnih troškova.
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